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PROBLEMS IN THE APPLICATION OF 
POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY TO LAW 
Christopher T. Wonnell* 
I. PURE NORMATIVE PHILOSOPHY, APPLIED POLITICAL 
PHILOSOPHY, AND THE LAW 
At least since the 1971 publication of John Rawls' book A Theory 
of Justice, the discipline of political philosophy has had considerable 
effect upon legal scholarship. 1 In private law, for example, the influ-
ence of political philosophy has been pervasive, significantly affecting 
theories of contracts,2 torts,3 and property.4 But perhaps the most im-
portant influence has been in the area of constitutional law, a legal 
realm that explicitly presents the question of_classes of judgments that 
ought not to be made by majoritarian political institutions. 5 
The transition from abstract political philosophy to concrete legal 
application is, however, not a simple one, and it is these transition 
problems that this article seeks to explore. At least since the time of 
Immanuel Kant, political philosophers have been taunted6 with the 
* Associate Professor of Law, University of San Diego. B.A. 1979, Northwestern Univer-
sity; J.D. 1982, University of Michigan. - Ed. I would like to express my appreciation to the 
following individuals whose comments upon earlier drafts of this article were very helpful: Larry 
Alexander, Barbara Banoff, Randy Barnett, Don Dripps, Paul Horton, Maimon Schwarzchild, 
and Paul Wohlmuth. 
1. Buchanan, A Critical Introduction to Rawls' Theory of Justice, in JOHN RAWLS' THEORY 
OF SOCIAL JUSTICE: AN INTRODUCTION 5 (1980) [hereinafter SOCIAL JUSTICE] (Rawls has in-
spired "a renaissance in political philosophy in America and the English-speaking world 
generally."). 
2. See, e.g., Barnett, A Consent Theory of Contract, 86 CoLUM. L. REV. 269 (1986) (liberta-
rian consent theory supports freedom of contract); Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law 
Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1685, 1717-21 (1976) (altruistic political philosophy supports 
compulsory terms in certain contracts). 
3. See, e.g., Epstein, A Theory of Strict Liability, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 151 (1973) {libertarian 
defense of causality-based tort liability); Schroeder, Rights Against Risks, 86 COLUM L. REV. 495 
(I 986) (utilitarian and rights-based approaches to risky conduct opposed in favor of approach 
accommodating both concerns). 
4. See, e.g., R. NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 150-53 (1974) (political philosophy 
defense of private property acquisition); R. DWORKIN, Liberalism, in A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE 
181, 200 (1985) {Liberalism opposes broad property rights over acquired objects but favors 
"some right to property" over "a range of personal possessions essential to dignity."). 
5. See, e.g., Dworkin, The Forum of Prindple, 56 N.Y.U. L. REV. 469, 517 (1981); Choper, 
The Supreme Court and the Political Branches: Democratic Theory and Practice, 122 U. PA. L. 
REV. 810, 830 (1974). 
6. See I. KANT, Theory and Practice Concerning the Cammon Saying: This May Be True in 
Theory But Does Nat Apply ta Practice, in THE PHILOSOPHY OF KANT 412 (C. Friedrich trans. 
1949). 
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cliche that their philosophies might "sound good in theory but won't 
work in practice." As a general critique of abstract theory, this time-
honored phrase is objectionable, for it insulates the implicit theories 
that underlie present practices from theoretical criticism.7 Neverthe-
less, this article takes the position that the cliche crudely and imper-
fectly states a very important truth: Some political philosophies that 
may be unobjectionable as pure normative systems are nevertheless 
likely to produce systematically objectionable results when they are 
concretely applied. Stated another way, this article seeks to construct 
a theory of the problems likely to be encountered in the application of 
political philosophies to legal practice. 
It is useful to begin the analysis by exploring an ambiguity in the 
function that the discipline of political philosophy seeks to fulfill. To 
keep the discussion as concrete as possible, let us use as an example 
the legal and political question of whether the confiscation of private 
property to benefit the needy is proper. 8 Different political philoso-
phies have presented varying answers to this question, ranging from 
the staunchly pro-property stance of the libertarian Robert Nozick9 to 
the ambivalent positions of Rawls 10 or the utilitarians 11 to the firmly 
anti-property views of the Critical Legal Studies movement. 12 Despite 
this race to discover the proper answer, however, it is rarely noticed 
that the question itself is ambiguous. On the one hand, political phi-
losophers might be trying to determine whether the confiscation of 
property would be justified if it does benefit the needy. More gener-
ally, this conception of political philosophy would entail hypotheti-
cally assuming factual arguments to be true and assessing the 
7. See J. KEYNES, THE GENERAL THEORY OF EMPLOYMENT INTEREST AND MONEY 383-
84 (1936). 
8. This question is posed explicitly, for example, in R. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROI'· 
ERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN 306-29 (1985). 
9. See R. NOZICK, supra note 4, at 26-35, 150-64. Not all libertarians agree with Nozick that 
moral rights extend to basic resources; it is the right in one's own person and talents that unites 
them. See Alexander, Liberalism as Neutral Dialogue: Ma11 and Ma1111a ill the Liberal State, 28 
UCLA L. REV. 816, 816-17 (1981) (arguing that "the question that most seriously divides liber-
als and separates the welfare-statists from the libertarians" is "the question of whether one is 
morally entitled to the fruits of one's good fortune in life's natural lottery of endowments and 
opportunities in the face of claims of superior need due to misfortune"). 
10. See J. RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 265-74 (1971). Rawls' theory of justice is con-
cerned with the "basic structure" of society, i.e .. its "principal economic and social arrange-
ments" in which Rawls expressly includes the institution of "private property in the mean~ of 
production." Id. at 7. He concludes that his theory is compatible with capitalism or socialism. 
11. See Harsanyi, Morality and the Theory of Rational Behm·ior, in UTll ITARIANISM ANll 
BEYOND 39, 41 (A. Sen & B. Williams eds. 1982). 
12. See, e.g .. Kennedy, supra note 2, at 1713-21 (contrasting the "ideal of individualism" 
which "provides a justification for the fundamental legal in~titutions of criminal law, property, 
tort, and contract" with a competing "ideal of altruism"). 
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normative sufficiency of those factual contentions as justifications for 
legal rules. Alternatively, political philosophers might be seeking to 
inform courts (and other political actors) as to whether they should 
allow the taking of private property if they perceive that such action 
would benefit the needy. This alternative conception of political phi-
losophy identifies a set of moral norms that judges and legislators 
should personally embrace and apply to the factual world as they per-
ceive it. 
In short, there are two distinct conceptions of the function that 
political philosophy seeks to perform, i.e., the questions it attempts to 
answer. For the sake of easy reference, I will call the conception of 
political philosophy as passing normative judgment upon factual the-
ses assumed to be true "pure normative philosophy," and the alterna-
tive conception of a set of values to be internalized and applied by 
judges, legislators, and other political actors "applied political 
philosophy." 
The contention to be advanced is that these two conceptions are 
indeed distinct, and that only a remarkable coincidence could make 
the same political philosophy ideal for both functions. The problem is 
that modern political philosophers are never clear about which of the 
two functions they want their philosophy to fulfill, and as a result they 
strain mightily to make the same philosophical concepts satisfy two 
fundamentally distinct goals. At best, this neglect of the distinction 
results in confusion; at worst, it overlooks the serious consequence 
that a particular philosophy might be quite appropriate for one func-
tion and yet grossly inadequate for the other. And it is in the area of 
law, where theories are applied by real human actors employing tools 
of vast coercive power, that the difficulties of overlooking the distinc-
tion are most directly manifested. 
In what ways might pure normative philosophy (PNP) and applied 
political ph~losophy (APP) differ? Let us begin with a statement of the 
purpose of political philosophy in these two conceptions: 
PNP: Political philosophy seeks to identify the types of arguments 
which, if true, would morally justify particular types of legal rules and 
political actions. 
APP: Political philosophy seeks to identify a set of values that would 
produce morally appropriate results if the values identified by the philos-
ophy were sincerely held by judges, legislators, and other political actors. 
This difference in purpose suggests the possibility that in certain 
circumstances the two ideals might diverge. For example, suppose 
that a political actor was tempted to placate a particular special inter-
est in a way that could not in fact be philosophically justified, i.e., an 
omniscient observer would say it did not promote maximum happi-
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ness, justice, etc. The possibility would still remain that the political 
actor might be able to convince herself that the action in question did 
promote the philosophical ideal. If a particular philosophical ideal 
was especially susceptible to such efforts at rationalization, would that 
argue that there was something wrong with the ideal itself or simply 
that it was not being followed? Surely that answer would depend upon 
what function the ideal was seeking to fulfill. Thus the first concrete 
distinction emerges: 
1. PNP: The temptation of public officials to rationalize narrow ends 
as being consistent with the philosophy is outside the scope of political 
philosophy, which is concerned with assessing the normative status of 
the successful implementation of alternative governing philosophies. 
Rationalization is simply one of many reasons why real world actors 
may fall short of a particular philosophical ideal; it does not discredit the 
ideal itself. 
APP: Political philosophy is concerned with the values legal and polit-
ical actors hold, so it is important to know how easy it will be for power 
holders to rationalize and psychologically harmonize the temptations of 
power with a sincere commitment to a particular philosophy. If such 
rationalization is extremely easy with a particular philosophy, this may 
be a good argument against that philosophy. 
A related and more general problem is that legal and political ac-
tors often have imperfect information. Political philosophies do not 
speak for themselves; they must be interpreted and applied. As a re-
sult, legal actors are likely to pass some laws or issue some decisions in 
the hope of vindicating a specific philosophical ideal when in fact they 
are hindering that ideal. If a political philosophy is susceptible to es-
pecially grievous mistakes based upon limited knowledge, does this ar-
gue against the philosophy or simply that it will often be 
unintentionally violated? Again, this may depend upon whether one 
wants a philosophy that produces good results when it is internalized 
and consciously applied by judges and legislators or simply a norma-
tive standard with which to evaluate results. A second distinction is 
thus apparent: 
2. PNP: The fact that different people in the real world of limited 
knowledge may be likely to interpret and apply a given philosophy differ-
ently is outside the scope of political philosophy, which is concerned 
with the philosophy correctly interpreted and applied. Thus, a defense 
of a given political philosophy is not a defense of every judge's or politi-
cian's sincere interpretation thereof and may indeed be a criticism of 
some predictable interpretations. 
APP: The fact that some political philosophies will lead sincere adher-
ents who hold legal and political power to reach conflicting and unpre-
dictable interpretations and applications more frequently than other 
philosophies is relevant in deciding among political philosophies, given 
the harmful effects of instability and unpredictability as well as the 
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harmful effects of the incorrect interpretations and applications 
themselves. 
Applied political philosophy inquires into the values one would 
want legal actors to hold and apply. However, the stability of an ini-
tially sincere commitment to a philosophy cannot be assumed; some 
institutions may weaken a previously sincere value commitment over 
time, or may attract opportunists to positions of power who have no 
such sincere commitment. 13 Problems arise if the political philosophy 
in question induces its initially sincere adherents to create those insti-
tutions which eventually undermine the commitment. Would such a 
tendency be an argument against that political philosophy? The an-
swer depends upon the conception of political philosophy's role and is 
much the same as before: 
3. PNP: Political philosophy does not pass on the truth of the under-
lying causal hypotheses, so the discipline itself is not charged with calcu-
lating the likelihood that the powers which were justified while the 
causal claims were true might attract other people to office who would 
make such claims even when they were untrue. Such opportunists sim-
ply are not following the philosophy, which reflects badly on them, not 
the philosophy. 
APP: Political philosophy is concerned not only with a first generation 
of sincere followers of the philosophy, but also with the question of 
whether similarly motivated people will continue to be attracted to the 
positions of power that the initially sincere followers created. Other 
things equal, a philosophy is better if the positions of power its adherents 
will sanction continue to be filled over time by people who accept its 
tenets. 
Finally, the two conceptions of political philosophy can differ in 
their concern for the visibility of abuses of a particular philosophy. If 
a court, for example, were abusing its power by making philosoph-
ically unjustified or biased decisions, the philosophy in question might 
have sufficiently malleable concepts that a plausible opinion disguising 
the abuse could be readily produced. As always, pure normative phi-
losophy has no trouble with this problem. The insincere abuse of phil-
osophical concepts cannot discredit the normative ideal itself; it is the 
ideal that allows us to call the action an insincere abuse. By contrast, 
if one wants to identify a political philosophy that will hold together 
an initial commitment by legal and political actors, the ability to insti-
tutionally check abuses of a particular philosophy may be of the great-
est importance: 
4. PNP: The fact that some political philosophies are more suscepti-
ble to insincere misuse than others because the violations of the philoso-
phy are easy to camouflage is irrelevant in deciding among philosophies, 
13. See F. HAYEK, THE ROAD TO SERFDOM (1944). 
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just as a murderer's ability to falsely represent his aggressive act as self-
defense is irrelevant to the morality of killing in genuine self-defense. 
Indeed, it is precisely the correct political philosophy that allows us to 
condemn the political action as an "insincere misuse." 
APP: The visibility of violations of a given philosophy is an important 
virtue of the philosophy, since it is an essential precondition to the crea-
tion of effective institutional checks on the insincere manipulation of 
philosophical concepts. 
To summarize the argument thus far, there are at least four rea-
sons why one might expect differences between the philosophies one 
would want to serve the pure normative philosophy function and the 
applied political philosophy function. The problems of rationalization 
and limited knowledge suggest that sincere commitment to and suc-
cessful application of a philosophy cannot be equated; the problems of 
attraction of the insincere and the lack of institutional checks on the 
abuse of philosophical concepts suggest that even a sincere commit-
ment may not remain stable. 
Of course, the two functions of political philosophy are linked, 
since the applied political philosophy ideal seeks to identify values 
that, if sincerely held and consistently preserved by legal and political 
institutions, would produce "desirable" results. Which results are 
"desirable" is presumably a question of pure normative philosophy. 
The fact that the two functions are linked, however, does not mean 
that they are the same or that the same political philosophy must be 
able to serve both functions. Only the most rarified of pure normative 
philosophies, in which nothing at all mattered except the Pure Will of 
the judge and politician, could make the two functions identical. 14 
The closest that political philosophers have come to recognizing 
this distinction is the division sometimes drawn between "first best" 
and "second best" political principles. 15 "First best" principles corre-
spond roughly with the ideal of pure normative philosophy, while any 
factual "imperfections" in the world such as incomplete information 
or incentives to misuse power generally are accommodated by more or 
less ad hoc modifications of the first best principles. 16 This conceptual 
scheme is analytically flawed and misleading. Incomplete information 
14. Despite his deontological and Kantian moorings, Rawls himself certainly does not fit this 
description. See J. RAWLS, supra note IO, at 30 ("All ethical doctrines worth our attention take 
consequences into account in judging rightness. One which did not would simply be irrational, 
crazy."). 
I 5. See Philips, Reflections on the Transition from Ideal to Non-Ideal Theory. 19 No Os 551 
(1985) (indicating the serious difficulties of trying to derive historically appropriate principles 
from those that would govern in a first best world). 
16. See, e.g., B. ACKERMAN, SOCIAL JUSTICE IN THE LIBERAi. STATE 234 (1980) ("Second-
best theory does not displace ideal theory; rather, it continues the same conversation, correcting 
earlier conclusions only when this can be justified by Neutral argument.") (emphasis in original). 
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and diverse incentive structures are not minor appendages upon a first 
best vision, but on the contrary are the very essence of legal reality, 17 
and no "technology of justice"18 is likely to remove them from that 
central position. As a result, the ideal political philosophy to govern 
the values and institutions of legal action is likely to look nothing like 
the Goods and Rights defended by normative philosophers, although 
complex causal analysis could show the two to be linked. 19 
The principal problem with the "second best" designation is con-
ceptual. The ideal applied political philosophy - whatever it may 
prove to be - is by definition the very best within its sphere. A judge 
or legislator who regarded herself as wise and good enough to disre-
gard its tenets and directly pursue (or create institutions that would 
allow her to directly pursue) the first best pure normative philosophy 
would be making matters worse; that is the cumulative tendency of the 
four identified distinctions. Stated another way, the applied political 
philosophy ideal seeks a philosophy that produces good results when 
the fallible political human mind consciously interacts with it; it is not 
second best because there is no alternative philosophy that could pro-
duce better interactions. To personify the ideals, the pure normative 
philosophy vision is not directly asking legal actors to believe in it or 
act upon it, but to participate in a system that satisfies it, while the 
applied political philosophy vision is indeed asking for action-motivat-
ing belief. 20 A judge or legislator who took the plausible step of as-
suming that a first best normative philosophy, to deserve its name, 
must be more worthy of action-motivating belief than a second best 
applied political philosophy would be committing a category mistake. 
That mistake can best be avoided by abandoning the concept of second 
best in this context, and acknowledging that there are two separate 
spheres of philosophical outlook, each having a particular political 
philosophy that is ideal within its sphere. 
The remainder of this article seeks to substantiate the thesis that 
modern political philosophies suffer from insufficient attention to the 
distinction between the two ideals of political philosophy as a disci-
pline. Part II considers the philosophy of the Critical Legal Studies 
movement, with particular emphasis upon the writings of Duncan 
Kennedy. Part III considers act and rule utilitarianism. Part IV ex-
17. See, e.g .. Hayek, The Use of Knowledge in Society, 35 AM. EcoN. REV. 519 (1945). 
18. This phrase is employed by Ackerman, B. ACKERMAN, supra note 16, at 21. 
19. See, e.g., R. EPSTEIN, supra note 8, at 344-45 (arguing that civic virtue and happiness are 
best obtained through such "[d]iscreet indirection"). 
20. The idea of personifying theories to determine whether it is appropriate to say the "goal" 
ofa theory is to compel belief in itself is taken from D. PARFIT, REASONS AND PERSONS 11-12 
{1984). 
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amines the philosophy of John Rawls and others who have followed 
him. Part V treats the libertarian analysis of Robert Nozick. Part VI 
concludes that the difficulties these philosophies have encountered are 
indeed symptomatic of the broader problem of the two distinct func-
tions that political philosophies have sought to perform. 
II. KENNEDY AND THE CRITICAL LEGAL SCHOLARS 
Critical Legal Studies (CLS) is perhaps less of a unified school than 
the other philosophies to be examined, and it may therefore be some-
what hazardous to focus attention upon any single individual's 
works.21 Nevertheless, Duncan Kennedy's writings do seem to be rep-
resentative of the movement on the specific points to be considered 
here- the need for altruism, sharing, and the values of community.22 
In any event, the writings of other CLS members are no clearer than 
Kennedy's on the relationship between the two distinct functions of 
political philosophy.23 
Kennedy seeks to contrast the political philosophies of "individu-
alism" and "altruism," arguing that the former improperly dominates 
legal discourse at the present time. Kennedy describes these competing 
visions as follows: 
The essence of individualism is the making of a sharp distinction be-
tween one's interests and those of others, combined with the belief that a 
preference in conduct for one's own interests is legitimate, but that one 
should be willing to respect the rules that make it possible to coexist with 
others similarly self-interested. The form of conduct associated with in-
dividualism is self-reliance .... 
The essence of altruism is the belief that one ought not to indulge a 
sharp preference for one's own interest over those of others. Altruism 
enjoins us to make sacrifices, to share, and to be merciful.24 
Kennedy has used these competing ideals to discuss a variety of 
21. See, e.g., Johnson, Do You Sincerely Want to be Radical?, 36 STAN. L. REV. 247, 248-49 
(1974) (noting the argument that CLS is too fragmented to constitute a coherent body of thought 
but concluding that "enough common elements exist to permit intelligent discussion of the move-
ment as a whole"). 
22. See id. at 249 (also focussing upon Kennedy's views as representative). 
23. The closest I have found to recognition of the distinction is a two-sentence passage in 
Unger, The Critical Legal Studies Movement, 96 HARV. L. REV. 563, 641 (1983): 
The higher standard of solidarity - the one that gives primacy to the other party's interests 
- is necessarily exceptional. Any attempt to insist upon it in the generality of dealings 
would depart so radically from the standards by which people ordinarily deal with each 
other that it would merely encourage massive circumvention and hypocrisy coupled with a 
stifling despotism of virtue. 
And yet even here Unger can be read as seeing the problem of "circumvention and hypocrisy" 
only in the attitudes of the regulated, not the regulators. 
24. Kennedy, supra note 2, at 1713, 1717 (emphasis in original). 
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political and legal institutions,25 including the question of whether a 
legal system should be characterized principally by rules or standards. 
Preferring the altruistic vision of standards, Kennedy argues that his 
casual conversations on the issue have indicated that the proponents of 
rules and standards possess fundamentally different values. Specifi-
cally, he offers the following catalog of the value terms most fre-
quently employed by proponents of rules and standards:26 
[A:] Good 
Neutrality 
Uniformity 
Precision 
Certainty 
Autonomy 
Rights 
Privacy 
Efficiency 
Order 
Exactingness 
Self-reliance 
Boundaries 
Stability 
Security 
Rules 
[B:] Bad 
Rigidity 
Conformity 
Anality 
Compulsiveness 
Alienation 
Vested Interests 
Isolation 
Indifference 
Reaction 
Punitiveness 
Stinginess 
Walls 
Sclerosis 
Threatenedness 
Standards 
[C:] Bad 
Bias 
Favoritism 
Sloppiness 
Uncertainty 
Totalitarianism 
Tyranny 
Intrusiveness 
Sentimentality 
Chaos 
Permissiveness 
Romanticism 
Invasion 
Disintegration 
Dependence 
[D:] Good 
Flexibility 
Individualization 
Creativity 
Spontaneity 
Participation 
Community 
Concern 
Equity 
Evolution 
Tolerance 
Generosity 
Empathy 
Progress 
Trust 
This fascinating value chart deserves careful consideration in light 
of the categories identified in this article. For example, it is interesting 
to compare Columns A and D as if they both purported to be compre-
hensive pure normative philosophies, i.e., the highest first best values 
of the normative universe. It seems clear that Column A would depict 
a deeply impoverished world, and that Column D, whatever its de-
fects, would be far preferable. Kennedy struggles to consider how in-
dividualism and rules could strike anyone as plausible rather than as 
"absurd or obviously evil."27 This language strongly suggests that 
Kennedy is indeed comparing Columns A and D as pure normative 
philosophy, where Column A, if it purported to be complete, would 
fully deserve Kennedy's description. 
25. For example, Kennedy criticizes the ideal of freedom of contract from an altruistic per-
spective, arguing that judges who refuse to enforce unfair contracts are "at work on the indispen-
sable task of imagining an altruistic order." Id. at 1778. 
26. Id. at 1710. 
27. See id. at 1746 ("It is not easy to reconstruct the Classical individualist economic vision, 
especially if we want to understand it from the inside as plausible, rather than absurd or obvi-
ously evil."). 
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As for the "vice words"28 in Columns B and C, the striking feature 
of these terms is the difference in the settings in which one would be 
likely to hear most of the words. Although some of the terms in Col-
umn B are obviously governmental, many of the terms seem to fit 
more plausibly as a list of human traits that might undermine the abil-
ity of an individual or small group to be spontaneous, loving, trusting 
friends. Column D appears to be roughly the opposite of Column B, 
with many of its terms clearly constituting values that would further 
such close relationships. By contrast, Column C seems to resonate 
with distrust of strangers - people with excessive confidence in their 
own objectivity and images of the world, described by Brandeis as 
"men of zeal, well-meaning but without understanding."29 Similarly, 
Column A represents the kinds of moral values one would probably 
hear in an individual citizen's defense against the men of zeal. 
If these Gestalt-like reactions to Kennedy's chart are widely 
shared, they appear to suggest a paradoxical feature of moral intu-
itions. The set of values that strike us as plausible candidates for first 
best pure normative philosophy (Column D) are also the values one 
would like to see among the small or intimate group. Nevertheless, 
one preserves a set of values that are distinctly inferior as pure norma-
tive philosophy (Column A) as a defense against the "men of zeal" 
who, "without understanding," seek the political promotion of their 
own interpretation of Column D. One also preserves two sets of vice 
terms, one for those traits that directly deprive us of the possibility of 
the first best small group ideals (Column B) and another for those 
traits that threaten to invoke unreliable political institutions in an ef-
fort to bring those ideals about (Column C). 
The philosopher who has seen these paradoxes most clearly is 
Friedrich Hayek. According to Hayek, societal evolution has pro-
duced a set of large-scale institutions that proved capable of preserving 
life, but the values that sustain those institutions are not the values of 
the small group.30 In Hayek's view, this is particularly insidious be-
cause human beings have evolved biologically for literally millions of 
years in small hunter-and-gatherer groups, and are, therefore, proba-
28. See generally Westen, "Freedom" and "Coercion" - Virtue Words and Vice Words, 1985 
DUKE L.J. 541. 
29. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 479 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
30. See F. HAYEK, THE MIRAGE OF SOCIAL JUSTICE 90 (1976): 
In the small group the individual can know the effects of his actions on his several fellows, 
and the rules may effectively forbid him to harm them in any manner and even require him 
to assist them in specific ways. In the Great Society many of the effects ofa person's actions 
on various fellows must be unknown to him. It can, therefore, not be the specific effects in 
the particular case, but only rules which define kinds of actions as prohibited or required, 
which must serve as guides to the individual. 
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bly genetically predisposed to embrace such small group values and to 
resist the restraints of the open society.31 And even if this sociobio-
logical thesis is incorrect, it is undoubtedly the case that most people 
developed their values among small groups of family and friends, and 
therefore may be predisposed to apply those values of sharing and sac-
rifice when they consider political questions. 32 
Of course there is no reason in the abstract why the things one 
most values in the small group could not serve as first principles to 
govern the institutions of political society. But Hayek's writings stand 
as a warning of the causal consequences of doing so. He suggests that 
the deliberate pursuit of small group values by the larger society ironi-
cally would frustrate the spontaneous societal order necessarily pre-
supposed by small groups in their own goals. 33 In the language of this 
article, Kennedy's Columns A and Care the virtue and vice terms at the 
level of applied political philosophy, while Columns Band Dare the vice 
and virtue terms at the level of pure normative philosophy. If Hayek's 
causal thesis is correct, Kennedy is committing a category mistake 
when he concludes that Columns B and D, because they are intuitively 
more compelling, should therefore be enshrined in the values and in-
stitutions of political society.34 
To summarize the argument, one who tries to apply normative first 
principles directly to political institutions will undoubtedly find "ab-
surd or obviously evil" a political system with "neutrality" and 
"rights" as its highest governing maxims. 35 Any sensible normative 
philosophy would place many values higher than these, especially the 
values of community, and most of the rest of Kennedy's Column D. 
But as Robert Nozick, whose philosophy is itself criticized in Part IV 
of this article, has quite correctly observed, "Utopia is not just a soci-
ety in which the [neutral, rights-based] framework is realized .... We 
live in particular communities. It is here that one's nonimperialistic 
vision of the ideal or good society is to be propounded and realized. 
Allowing us to do that is what the framework is for. " 36 Allowing us to 
31. See E. Bun.ER, HAYEK: HIS CONTRIBUTION TO THE POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC 
THOUGHT OF OUR TIME 37 (1983) ("In a sense, man was civilised against his wishes. The old 
morality was deeply embedded in human instincts as a result of the hundreds of millenia which 
men spent in tribal groups."). 
32. Cf id. at 33-34. 
33. See id. at 34-36. 
34. See e.g., Kennedy, supra note 2, at 1719 (arguing that an altruist would view law·s effect 
upon the previously wicked man as one that "provides him a conscience"). 
35. See id. at 1715 (arguing that individualism responds to "the political rhetoric of free will. 
autonomy, and natural rights"'). 
36. R. NOZICK, supra note 4, at 332 (emphasis in original). 
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pursue Column D is what the "applied political philosophy" Columns 
A and Care for. 
Does this framework really require rules rather than standards?37 
Many who have had a thorough exposure to American legal education 
will doubt this claim. And it is undoubtedly this shared skepticism 
about the possibility or desirability of rigid rules that Kennedy is seek-
ing to tap in order to enlist support for CLS "altruistic" political phi-
losophy. The views one develops about rules versus standards from 
reviewing legal materials, and especially standard casebooks, are intu-
itions that can mislead; a broader view shows how completely Western 
society is and ought to be dependent upon rigid rules. Consider any 
standard casebook illustration.38 It is likely to seem that the judge 
could justify accepting either the plaintiff's or the defendant's argu-
ment; the rule does not unambiguously determine the result and some 
resort to vaguer standards may be necessary. Four considerations sug-
gest, however, that this perspective on the question of rules and stan-
dards is misleading. First, the parties to the case are perhaps two or 
three out of billions of people on earth; almost all of the rest, if they 
had appeared in the case, would have had their claim resolved by a flat 
rule. Second, the positions taken by the plaintiff and defendant are 
only two of an almost infinite number of theoretically possible results 
of the case; the ovenvhelming bulk of possible outcomes would be 
barred by a flat rule. Third, casebook illustrations are but a tiny per-
centage of the cases that arise, and they are studied because they 
seemed to the parties to have legal issues worth appealing and to the 
casebook authors to present interesting legal questions. Fourth, the 
legal system as a whole tends to operate when rights are in dispute; in 
the bulk of social situations, the rules are sufficiently clear that no one 
seriously contemplates a lawsuit. Thus, while dependence of legal ed-
ucation upon standard casebook illustrations has many virtues, it is 
37. Hayek of course has argued that the rule of law is central to a liberal society, although 
standards to handle hard cases are inevitable. See E. BUTLER, supra note 31, at 32: 
Complete certainty of the law is, of course, an ideal which we can never attain, since we arc 
constantly refining the verbal formulations of law which we make in our continuing at· 
tempts to discover the rules of true justice. These formulations, however, must always be 
consistent with accepted notions of the 'sense of justice· and thus make it possible to predict 
with some accuracy the outcome of any court case in which they are tested .... 
The rule of law therefore ensures that decisions are made according to known and gen· 
eral rules and not according to the apparent desirability of particular outcomes. 
38. "Any" illustration is no doubt an overstatement; some, perhaps many, standard casebook 
illustrations are resolvable by flat rules. See R. EPSTEIN, supra note 8, at 24 ("Yet through all 
the doctrinal murkiness, the settled legal rules make perfectly clear, more than 99.9 percent of 
the time, who, if anyone, possesses and owns anything."). This article does not take a position on 
how many of the cases law students deal with are truly "hard cases"; the point of the discussion 
in the text is to place the entire enterprise in a larger context. · 
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worth asking what subliminal message about political philosophy, in-
cluding the rules versus standards debate, it is creating in those who 
experience such an education. 
In many respects, the political philosophy of CLS is simply sad 
because, if implemented, it would produce not only unintended conse-
quences, but consequences directly opposite to those intended. Ken-
nedy hopes that altruism and empathy will be encouraged by political 
actors who set aside rigid entitlements to enforce concrete, shared 
community values.39 Roberto Unger hopes that a spiral of increasing 
community will progressively improve human beings in their desire to 
fulfill their nature.40 But these claims entail/actual as well as norma-
tive views, and the unproven character of such factual assertions at the 
applied political philosophy level is concealed by including them 
within a political philosophy that clearly purports to be a normative 
theory of first principles.41 
Now it may be the case that most people would prefer to see a 
public commitment to concrete economic justice rather than to ab-
stract entitlements, i.e., to a world in which those who have more than 
they socially deserve will share and be altruistic with those who have 
less than they socially deserve. The problem, however, is that they are 
likely to favor such a goal for different and often contradictory rea-
sons, 42 each economic group believing that the trait in which it excels 
is most socially relevant.43 Most people probably believe that they are 
entitled to their current income and, if true social justice prevailed, to 
a fair amount more as well.44 Most individuals would be violently 
39. See notes 35-36 supra and accompanying text. 
40. R. UNGER, KNOWLEDGE AND POLITICS 239 (1975) ("[B]oth human nature and our 
understanding of it can progress through a spiral of increasing community and diminishing 
domination."). 
41. See generally Kennedy, supra note 2, at 1710 ("The different values that people com-
monly associate with the formal modes of rule and standard are conveyed by the emotive or 
judgmental words that the advocates of the two positions use in the course of debate about a 
particular issue."). 
42. See F. HAYEK, STUDIES IN PHILOSOPHY, POl.ITICS AND ECONOMICS 242-43 (1967) 
("[T]he word 'social' presupposes the existence of known and common aims behind the activities 
of a community, but does 1101 define them.") (emphasis in original). 
43. See F. HAYEK, supra note 30, at 77-78: 
[W]hen we ask what ought to be the relative remunerations of a nurse and a butcher, of a_ 
coal miner and a judge at a high court, of the deep sea diver or the cleaner of sewers, of the 
organizer ofa new industry and a jockey, of the inspector of taxes and the inventor ofa life-
saving drug, of the jet pilot or the professor of mathematics, the appeal to "social justice" 
does not give us the slightest help in deciding .... 
44. See E. BUTLER, supra note 31, at 95: 
Once a government takes upon itself the task of redistributing incomes on the basis of some 
measure of merit or "social justice" ... [a]ll will claim that their efforts are more meritori-
ous than others, and that their share should be increased. Because there are no agreed rules 
which help to decide who should get what, the decisions of the government will be arbitrary 
and unpredictable. 
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incensed if some altruistic planner told them that their income must be 
reduced by forty percent because, after the planner's empathy for all 
was balanced, their position in the community made them worth only 
that lower figure. 
The problem is evident enough; there may be a shared desire for 
concrete as opposed to abstract economic fairness, but the perceptions 
of concrete fairness held by individuals are incompatible with even the 
present amount of wealth, much less with the far smaller pie that 
would be available under such a scheme.45 No group will believe that 
an honest and impartial judge could assess their fundamental worth 
within the community very far from where they themselves place it, 
with the result that almost everyorze will come to believe the government 
must be partial toward someone else. Groups would respond to an ad-
verse assessment by accelerating their political activity to correct an 
obvious (to them) injustice, but this acceleration would only lead to 
further decreases in overall income46 and more extreme anger at both 
the unjust system and their enemies' competing conceptions of con-
crete justice.47 
The essential problem is that concrete economic or social justice is 
a "mirage"48 produced by each individual's correct view that the polit-
ical authorities have the power to eliminate for any given individual 
any scarcity barrier between that individual's income and her concep-
tion of her own worth. It is a mirage because the government does not 
have that power for all individuals taken together. 49 That is especially 
true when one considers that a public declaration that henceforth the 
government will not respect abstract rights but will promote concrete 
economic fairness would significantly increase expectations, because 
each group would feel sincerely that concrete fairness would more 
generously reward its own best trait. so 
It is not obvious where this scenario - community infighting over 
affirmation of fundamentals by individuals enraged by their relative 
shares of a declining pie - would end. Certainly it would not end 
45. See F. HAYEK, THE POLITICAL ORDER OF A FREE PEOPLE 150 (1979) ("Once politics 
becomes a tug-of-war for shares in the income pie, decent government is impossible."), 
46. See E. BUTLER, supra note 31, at 97-102. 
47. The governmental paralysis at this point is likely to inspire a demand for "strong leader· 
ship," and in a society in which power means so much, true socialists wilt be deterred by their 
principles to do what it takes to obtain power, leaving the worst on top. Hayek's analysis of this 
dynamic remains one of the best. See F. HAYEK, supra note 13, at 134-52. 
48. See note 30 supra. 
49. See F. HAYEK, supra note 45, at 103 ("[I]t soon ceases to be the 'deserts' but becomes 
exclusively the 'political necessity' which determines which groups are to be favoured at general 
expense."). 
50. See note 44 supra and accompanying text. 
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with agreement as to the "community good"; in fact, it is difficult to 
see how the poisonous public discourse of groups denying each other's 
public claims to worth and wealth could keep from accelerating in a 
declining and politicized society.51 With most convinced that the gov-
ernment must be partial to someone else in order to explain a public 
declaration that their concrete worth in the community is so different 
from their own self-perception, scapegoating might be the only shared 
desire remaining. s2 
It is probably inevitable that the wealth wanted by all individuals 
in any society, added together, will total more than the wealth avail-
able. But a society is far healthier when the wealth that all individuals 
believe they must be given, added together, is only 105 percent of the 
available wealth rather than 405 percent. 53 Of course, none of this is 
to say that the government should not help those in society who can-
not help themselves; the wealthy may complain, but justice is worth 
certain costs in disharmony. Nevertheless, there is simply no parallel 
between modest sacrifices demanded to help the poor and a system 
that chooses to make the whole society serve a concrete communitar-
ian end over which everyone must fight to dominate or be dominated. 
The last trait such a system would further is human empathy. 
This pessimistic scenario certainly has not been proven conclu-
sively, and perhaps some modest communitarian values would not 
generate anything like such a reverse spiral of negative sentiment. The 
point is, however, that CLS has chosen to embrace a political philoso-
phy that does not take factual scenarios of this nature seriously, but 
contents itself with the obvious normative point that rights and neu-
trality cannot be the highest moral values. 54 Obvious normative 
points are not enough to satisfy the demands of an applied political 
philosophy. In order to be persuasive, CLS representatives must ad-
vance a causal thesis that political actors who consciously seek to re-
quire "altruism" and the "community good" will actually have that 
effect in a world of unintended consequences. 
51. See E. BUTLER, supra note 31, at 81 (discussing the inherent "conflicts when the valua-
tions of the planners disagree with the valuations which people have of themselves"). 
52. As Hayek notes, the easiest shared concrete end is usually a negative one, such as a 
virulent nationalism or shared hatred of an ethnic minority. See F. HAYEK, supra note 13, at 
139. 
53. See E. BUTLER, supra note 31, at 80 (arguing that the perceived unfairness of one's in-
come can be more easily borne "[w]here the hazards of skill and luck and impersonal market 
forces determine income" than where incomes are perceived to be the product of a consciously 
planned decision). 
54. See notes 34-35 & 39-40 supra and accompanying text. 
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Ill. ACT AND RULE UTILITARIANISM 
Utilitarianism nicely illustrates the confusion generated by the at-
tempt to use the same political philosophy to serve both the pure nor-
mative philosophy and applied political philosophy functions. 
Abstracting from complexities of the doctrine not pertinent here, utili-
tarianism as a pure normative philosophy asserts that the ideal state of 
affairs is one which maximizes happiness.ss Utilitarians are often 
pressed to justify their view in the face of hypotheticals such as: "Sup-
pose many people derived tremendous pleasure from watching the suf-
fering of a few. Would you nevertheless affirm the value of maximum 
happiness?"S6 
The purpose of this article is not to assess whether utilitarianism 
can be defended in the face of this and other hypotheticals. The point 
is rather that this is a perfectly proper question to ask from the per-
spective of pure normative philosophy. Moreover, the common utili-
tarian attempts to escape such dilemmas by "changing the 
hypothetical" must be rejected as illegitimate. For example, utilitari-
ans might object that "people could not derive enough pleasure to out-
weigh the suffering" or "a system that allowed such spectacles of 
cruelty would be uncontrollable and would eventually generate net 
disutility."s7 These responses are simply irrelevant from the perspec-
tive of normative philosophy. The question can simply be rephrased: 
"Would you favor such spectacles of suffering if they did maximize 
happiness and if they would not be uncontrollable?" Pure normative 
philosophy should in principle be able to answer this question even if 
this state of affairs could never obtain in the real world. ss 
55. See Smart, An Outline of a System of Utilitarian Ethics, in J. SMART & B. WILLIAMS, 
UTILITARIANISM: FOR AND AGAINST I (1973) [hereinafter UTILITARIANISM: FOR AND 
AGAINST]. One of the key complexities is whether the ideal state of affairs is one that maximizes 
average utility or total utility. The two theories differ when issues of population size are treated 
as variable, i.e., should one seek to increase the size of the population to increase total utility even 
if average utility is decreased? Smart appears to favor the classical utilitarian position of maxi· 
mizing total utility. Id. at 27-28. 
56. See Williams, A Critique of Utilitarianism, in UTILITARIANISM: FOR AND AGAINST, 
supra note 55, at 105 (utilitarianism might sanction persecution of intensely hated minorities). 
57. See, e.g., Smart, supra note 55, at 70-71 (responding to a similar hypothetical by saying 
"[l]et us hope that this is a logical possibility and not a factual one"). 
58. It has been persuasively argued that our moral institutions have evolved to enable us to 
handle the kinds of facts that are actually likely to arise, rather than bizarre counterfactual hy-
potheticals. See Hare, Ethical Theory and Utilitarianism, in UTILITARIANISM AND BEYOND 
supra note 11, at 23, 30-36. Some anti-utilitarian hypothetical cases are not so clearly bizarre, 
however, and the possibility must be entertained that it is the maximum utility principle that hns 
evolved because in our actual world its implications are not too bad. In any event, the epistemo-
logical difficulty of knowing the proper principles to govern in counterfactual worlds docs not 
mean that there are no such principles, and since many worlds once believed to be counterfactual 
have become real, it is better to have some moral beliefs about counterfactual cases rather than 
none. 
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Since this point is plausible enough, why might a utilitarian never-
theless consider her response legitimate? The answer seems to be that 
she has in mind the conscious implementation of utilitarian principles 
by the legal process, and she wants to argue that such a deliberate 
policy would not produce unfortunate spectacles. 59 In other words, 
the utilitarian is responding to a critique of the utilitarian doctrine's 
ability to serve as a pure normative philosophy by asserting its ability 
to serve the separate applied political philosophy function. The prob-
lem is that this shift is nowhere acknowledged. Of course it is true 
that in designing legal institutions one can safely neglect consequences 
that could not occur in the real world. But notice two effects of the 
utilitarian's grasping for a utilitarian applied political philosophy as an 
argument that also purports to defend utilitarianism as a normative 
philosophy. The first effect is that the normative philosopher is now 
philosophically predisposed to accept certain causal theses and to reject 
others, i.e., to prefer the thesis that public spectacles cannot maximize 
utility. The second effect is to leave a gap in the normative system, so 
that if it should prove to be true that spectacles of suffering do increase 
utility, one has said nothing to oppose or support such spectacles. 
Stated another way, attempting to answer arguments addressed at 
the pure normative philosophy level with responses at the applied 
political philosophy level tends to warp or artificially distort both fac-
tual inquiry and normative philosophy. It distorts factual inquiry by 
predisposing people to prefer one factual thesis over another for nor-
mative reasons, a practice with deleterious consequences sufficiently 
clear that the Lysenko experience should suffice as a warning. 60 It also 
tends to distort normative philosophy by arguing that since certain 
states of the world are not possible, there is no need to construct a 
normative philosophy that evaluates their relative desirability. 
Suppose, however, that the utilitarian does not take this step, but 
chooses to defend public utility-maximizing spectacles. Again, the 
question here is not whether this response is correct as a matter of 
normative philosophy; it is at least working consistently within the 
same discipline. The utilitarian may now be asked whether she is an 
"act utilitarian," arguing that each actor should seek to maximize util-
ity with each act, or a "rule utilitarian" who argues that actors should 
59. See id. at 30 ('"[T]hat no actual Nazis had such intense desires [to outweigh the harm 
they caused] is, I think, obvious .... ") (emphasis in original). 
60. I have discussed the problem of value predispositions to accept factual propositions in 
Wonnell, Truth and the Marketplace of Ideas, 19 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 669, 696·709 (1986) (So· 
viet geneticist Lysenko's erroneous scientific theories were widely accepted in the Soviet Union 
long after they had been rejected by the scientific community elsewhere because the theories were 
in agreement with Stalin's Marxist ideology.) 
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comply with rules and that rulemakers should seek to maximize 
utility.61 
The problem here is that the utilitarian is being asked to step out of 
normative philosophy into applied political philosophy. As a norma-
tive philosophy, utilitarianism praises a state of affairs and says noth-
ing directly about maxims of conduct that individual actors or 
rulemakers should personally embrace. Perhaps if each actor tried to 
maximize utility as she saw it with each act, total utility would be less 
than if each actor had a different motivation.62 It might also be true 
that if each rulemaker tried to maximize utility as she saw it, and other 
actors complied with such rules, total utility would be less than if the 
rulemaker and/or the rule followers had a different motivation. 
These problems are inevitable when normative philosophy seeks to 
pronounce that judges and legislators ought to consciously follow a 
conduct rule without any attempt to identify scientifically the actual 
consequences that might follow. 63 However, whether the unintended 
consequences of converting a normative philosophy into an applied 
political philosophy are mere matters of second best housekeeping or 
whether they fundamentally warp the political philosophy in question 
depends upon just what those consequences are. 
In the case of utilitarianism as an applied political philosophy, the 
neglected consequences indeed seem to be grave. While an enormous 
amount has been written against utilitarian political philosophy, by 
and large the critique has been wide of the mark. The criticism typi-
cally focuses upon the legitimate problems of utilitarianism as a nor-
mative philosophy, i.e., that restrictions on the liberty of a hated 
minority might increase total happiness. As a practical matter in 
political theory, these anomalies in utilitarianism as a normative phi-
losophy seem relatively minor. Trampling important civil liberties 
rarely satisfies the maximum happiness criterion;64 German society 
under Hitler was not a joyful one. Of course, to whatever extent utili-
61. For a defense of rule utilitarianism, see Harsanyi, Rule Utilitarianism, Equality and Jus· 
tice, 2 Soc. PHIL. & POLY. 115 (1985). 
62. See id. at 127 ("[R]ule utilitarianism will yield a higher level of social utility [than net 
utilitarianism] because it requires wider respect for other people's rights and for our own special 
obligations."). 
63. See D. PARFIT, supra note 20, at 45-49 (arguing that a consequentialist could consider 
acting morally to be a good in itself). 
64. See Goldman, Rawls and Utilitarianism. in SOCIAL JUSTICE, supra note I, at 360 ("[A]t 
least if Rawls' own empirical assumptions are true ... the contrast between utiliturianism und 
Rawls' principles of justice with respect to treatment of basic liberties is for less dramatic than 
much of Rawls' discussion would suggest."). On the ideu of the indirect pursuit of utility 
through respecting liberty, see Gray, Indirect Utility and Fundamental Rights. 1 Soc. PHii.. & 
POl.Y. 73 (1984). 
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tarianism is defective as a normative philosophy, a political system 
that satisfied its tenets would make some improper decisions. But a 
society that actually adopted every policy that truly maximized happi-
ness would probably be such a delightful society that people today 
could not begin to imagine it; the few philosophically mistaken policies 
probably would be seen as a trivial price to pay for such a society. 
This of course does not justify the philosophical mistakes; it simply 
suggests that the critique of utilitarianism as an applied political phi-
losophy should not focus primarily upon its legitimate defects as a 
normative philosophy. 
Rather, the principal defects with utilitarianism as an applied 
political philosophy relate to the structural differences between the 
two ideals of political philosophy identified in Part I. A governing 
body might be instructed to satisfy the maximum utility goal. But 
would such a body actually satisfy the goal? The temptation to pass 
special interest legislation and rationalize it as being utility-maximiz-
ing is clear enough. Utilitarianism in itself does not make any class of 
actions categorically wrong; everything depends upon one's guess 
about the effects of a policy upon the psychic state of millions of indi-
viduals. 65 The guess a political actor makes will be heavily influenced 
by the information and incentive structure facing her. Public choice 
theory66 documents the fact that the information reaching legislators 
is starkly distorted; subtleties of detail are lost in statistical aggre-
gates, 67 and concentrated interests lobby heroically. 68 As for incen-
tives, the democratic process creates an incentive to pass a continuous 
stream of laws with visible, concentrated benefits and invisible, diffuse 
harms. 69 And of course without such democratic checks human ac-
tors are likely to have their own set of differential sympathies, 70 
whether as a result of their biological nature71 or their socialization.72 
Without a sense that certain kinds of actions are per se improper, i.e., 
65. See note 56 supra and accompanying text. 
66. The pioneering work of this discipline is Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 
BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. Sci. 3 (1971). 
67. See D. LAVOIE, NATIONAL ECONOMIC PLANNING: WHAT Is LEFT? 104 (1985) 
("Armed only with these aggregative models of the economy, it is hardly surprising that govern-
ment policy has been completely impotent in the face of the severe and worsening problems of 
the contemporary world."). 
68. See Wonnell, Economic Due Process and the Preservation of Competition, II HASTINGS 
CONST. L.Q. 91, 107-08 (1983). 
69. Id. at 100-11. 
70. See D. FREEDMAN, HUMAN SOCIOBIOLOGY: A HOLISTIC APPROACH (1979). 
71. Id. For a critique of these sociobiological claims for a biological basis behind human 
action, see P. KITCHER, VAULTING AMBITION: SOCIOBIOLOGY AND THE QUEST FOR HUMAN 
NATURE {1985). 
72. There is considerable literature on the question of reference groups and their effect on the 
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without any sense that individuals have certain categorical rights, it 
would take an almost superhuman person to keep her guess about util-
ity effects from being influenced by these persistent pressures. And 
since different legislators will assess the imponderable of the utility 
calculation differently, uncertain and unpredictable legislation will 
surely be the rule. 
These abstract difficulties have assumed tangible form in the area 
of constitutional law, particularly in the sphere of economic liberties. 
For many years, the Supreme Court took the position that legislation 
could be invalidated under the due process clause if it unreasonably 
limited freedom of contracting by private parties. This approach led 
of course to decisions such as Lochner v. New York, 73 invalidating 
maximum hours legislation for bakers, that numerous commentators 
attacked as shielding the oppression of the poor.74 Since the New 
Deal, the Court has indicated that legislatures have essentially free 
rein to pass economic regulations enhancing the utility of society, 
uninhibited by notions of liberty of contract. 75 
Unfortunately, contemporary experience with the unleashing of an 
applied political philosophy of utilitarianism in economic affairs, un-
constrained by alternative conceptions of economic liberties, has been 
quite sobering. In numerous cases, legislators apparently convinced 
themselves that statutes conferring the narrowest of special interest 
privileges - for optometrists, 76 attorneys, 77 and other occupational 
groups78 - promoted the general welfare. Despite the restrictions on 
occupational and contractual freedom that these statutes entailed, the 
Court felt obliged to defer, adding the faint hope that isolated and 
diffuse consumers and would-be producers had an adequate remedy 
through the political process.79 Utilitarianism in economic affairs has 
thus served to unleash a negative sum game of perpetual rent seeking, 
a process that ironically has in all probability significantly reduced ag-
gregate utility.80 Some due process limitation on the applied political 
formation and alteration of attitudes. For a review of that literature, see M. SMITH, PERSUASION 
AND HUMAN ACTION 164-90 (1982). 
73. 198 U.S. 45 (1905). 
74. See, e.g., Wellington, Common Law Rules and Constitutional Double Standards: Some 
Notes on Adjudication, 83 YALE L.J. 221, 280-85 (1973); J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 
14-15 (1980). 
75. See, e.g., United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144 (1938). 
76. See Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483 (1955). 
77. See Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726 (1963). 
78. The problems were presaged in the Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36 (1872). 
79. See, e.g., Lee Optical, 348 U.S. at 486-88; Skrupa, 372 U.S. at 728-33. 
80. See, e.g., Rottenberg, Introduction, in OCCUPATIONAL LICENSURE AND REGULATION I, 
6-9 (S. Rottenberg ed. 1980). 
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philosophy of utilitarianism may be necessary to promote utility after 
all. 
IV. RAWLS' THEORY OF JUSTICE 
Professor John Rawls' famous theory of justice expressly seeks to 
improve upon utilitarianism.s 1 What is not at all clear is whether 
Rawls perceives the problem to be with utilitarianism as a normative 
philosophy or as an applied political philosophy, or even that he per-
ceives the two to be distinct. His well-known conclusion is that the 
proper moral principles to govern the basic structures2 of society are 
those that people would choose behind a veil of ignorance concerning 
their own particular interests and conceptions of the Good. He argues 
that such depersonalized contractors would choose to secure equal lib-
erties and to permit only those economic and social inequalities that 
would operate to the benefit of the least well-off, by providing the bet-
ter-off with necessary incentives. s3 Rawls argues that the parties in 
the original position would not seek to maximize utility, but would 
instead acknowledge that every person possesses an inviolability based 
on justice that not even the welfare of the society as a whole can 
override. s4 
There is no question that Rawls successfully taps many of the 
moral intuitions of modern man, and his accomplishments at the pure 
normative philosophy level cannot be denied. The religious dissident 
or racial minority group member does seem entitled to moral protec-
tion even against the occasional act of persecution that does maximize 
utility.ss The person born blind and handicapped does seem entitled 
to coerced transfer payments from the more fortunate without regard 
to any utilitarian calculus. s6 Moreover, the reason for these intuitions 
81. J. RAWLS, supra note 10, at 14. 
82. Rawls says that the basic structure of society is the primary subject of justice, and he 
defines the basic structure as "the way in which the major social institutions distribute funda-
mental rights and duties and determine the division of advantages from social cooperation. By 
major institutions I understand the political constitution and the principal economic and social 
arrangements." Id. at 7. 
83. Id. at 60-61. 
84. Id. at 167-92. 
85. Actually, Rawls continues to make the liberties of these individuals contingent upon em-
pirical facts, since the liberties are to be protected only if, given knowledge of the general facts of 
society, the parties in the original position would choose them. Id. at 159-60. However, it does 
seem plausible that individuals who wanted to make a compact they could willingly keep would 
see to it that these liberties were protected. 
86. Obviously, the description of the individual as "blind and handicapped" is intended to 
distinguish this intuition from the case of an individual who is poor as a result of personal choices 
- leisure over work, spending over savings, etc. - where the moral problems are much harder. 
Clearly, these choices are heavily influenced in fact by the general culture in which the individual 
is raised, and it is hard to expect people to transcend their environment readily. On the other 
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does seem to be a sense that "there but for the Grace of God go I" and 
that we ought not to exploit unfairly our good fortune in life's lottery. 
On the other hand, it appears at times that Rawls is seeking to 
develop his own applied political philosophy that will improve upon 
utilitarian applied political philosophy. Unfortunately, Rawls seems 
no more aware than the utilitarians that the two functions of political 
philosophy are distinct, and that only a remarkable coincidence could 
make the same philosophy ideal for each function. Instead, Rawls' 
book oscillates confusingly between the pure normative philosophy 
and the applied political philosophy functions - a confusion with det-
rimental effects on both disciplines. 
The first example of this confusion is Rawls' emphasis upon the 
stability of his conception. s7 Rawls is disturbed by the fact that utilita-
rianism is willing to justify extreme unhappiness for some by argu-
ments about the average or aggregate happiness.ss For Rawls, this 
conception is unstable because people are separate beings; the worst-
off cannot be expected to have such complete empathy for their fellow 
human beings that they will see their utilitarian society as optimally 
just. s9 And Rawls clearly wants a philosophy that all people can bring 
themselves to accept and act upon, a philosophy that expresses their 
nature as free and equal moral beings.9° 
Is Rawls' "stability" argument made at the level of pure normative 
philosophy or at the level of applied political philosophy? Rawls 
clearly defends a basic structure of society that will consciously seek to 
maximize the "primary goods" of the class of society with the smallest 
quantum of such goods.91 "Primary goods" are things that people 
hand, personal responsibility for these choices may be the only way to change that culture over 
the long run. 
Rawls himself does not draw this distinction sharply, noting: "The assertion that a man 
deserves the superior character that enables him to make the effort to cultivate his abilities is ..• 
problematic; for his character depends in large part upon fortunate family and social circum-
stances for which he can claim no credit." Id. at 104. On the other hand, Dworkin stresses the 
distinction between wealth differences that flow from differences in personal choices and wealth 
differences that flow from differences in innate ability or initial entitlements. R. DWORKIN, Why 
Liberals Should Care About Equality, in A MATIER OF PRINCIPLE, supra note 4, at 205. 
87. See J. RAWLS, supra note 10, at 496-504. 
88. Id. at 500. 
89. See id.: 
It is evident why the utilitarian stresses the capacity for sympathy. Those who do not bene-
fit from the better situation of others must identify with the greater sum (or average) of 
satisfaction else they will not desire to follow the utility criterion. . • . [A] marked capacity 
for sympathetic identification seems relatively rare. 
90. See id. at 251-57, 587 (presenting this Kantian conception of the original position and 
suggesting that its adoption by each person demonstrates that person's "purity of heart"). 
91. See id. at 95 ("On this conception of social justice, then, expectations are defined as the 
index of primary goods that a representative man can reasonably look forward to. A person's 
prospects are improved when he can anticipate a preferred collection of these goods."). 
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presumably want no matter what concrete ends they have; liberty and 
income are examples.92 The bottom representative person thus has a 
moral "lien" of sorts on everyone above her; the proceeds of the activi-
ties of all belong as of right to the bottom person except those proceeds 
which are necessary to induce the activities themselves.93 Is Rawls 
offering a political thesis, that such a structure of society will indeed be 
stable and capable of generating its own support? Or is he offering a 
metaethical thesis, that a philosophy which some people cannot bring 
themselves to accept is for that reason an objectionable normative 
philosophy? 
The truth seems to be that Rawls is making both the political and 
metaethical claims.94 But surely this attempt to ride two horses can-
not succeed. At the metaethical level, Rawls wants a pure normative 
philosophy that one hundred percent of the citizenry theoretically 
ought to be able to bring themselves to accept. In order to accomplish 
this goal, however, Rawls is forced to construct a philosophy that re-
quires extraordinary good will of the majority; individuals in the ma-
jority are urged that on issues of society's structure they ought to 
forget entirely who they are and what they have.95 The majority is 
also told that justice requires that the position of the worst-off repre-
sentative person be maximized without any regard to the effect of such 
actions on the total wealth or total utility of the majority.96 
Rawls notes the central importance of stability in political institu-
tions, but his stability analysis is concerned with the need to avoid 
crime, civil disturbances, and other problems that arise when small 
groups are disaffected from the dominant philosophy and choose not 
to obey it. 97 As a result, Rawls misses the critical significance of se-
curing a stable commitment to a philosophy (or its results) from the 
majority, since without their reliable assent the philosophy cannot be 
implemented through legitimate institutions. Rawls' philosophy is 
starkly countermajoritarian in urging that everything possible must be 
done to maximize the position of the worst-off class at any cost before 
the majority can pay any attention to its own interests. This is quite a 
92. Rawls lists as primary goods "the bases of self-respect" as well as "rights and liberties, 
powers and opportunities, income and wealth." These are goods that "normally have a use 
whatever a person's rational plan of life." Id. at 62. 
93. For a similar characterization of Rawls' position, see R. EPSTEIN, supra note 8, at 341. 
94. For a view that Rawls embraces the metaethical claim, see D. PARFIT, supra note 20, at 
43. On the other hand, Rawls stresses that the lack of stability caused by inconsistency between 
one's conception of the Good and the public definition of the Right would mean that "penal 
devices will play a much larger role in the social system." J. RAWLS, supra note 10, at 576. 
95. See J. RAWLS, supra note 10, at 136-42. 
96. See id. at 152-57. 
97. See id. at 240-41. 
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different thing from urging a majority to incur modest sacrifices for a 
minority or to respect "minority" rights that might benefit any one of 
their number at a later time. 
At the applied political philosophy level, the problem is not that 
Rawls' philosophy might fall on deaf ears. Rather, the problem is that 
the predictable majoritarian hostility to a starkly countermajoritarian 
philosophy is quite likely to lead those who are persuaded by that phi-
losophy to conclude that majoritarian institutions themselves have lost 
some of their philosophical legitimacy and may be inherently unjust. 
If long experience shows that majorities simply will not make deci-
sions without regard to their own interests, the attractiveness of alter-
native institutions such as the courts that do not depend upon 
majoritarian consent is certain to increase.98 Predictably, numerous 
commentators have proposed precisely this constitutional role for the 
judiciary, i.e., the protection of values that are so important that they 
cannot be left to the valuations of elected majorities. A leading exam-
ple is Professor Michelman's argument that courts should secure af-
firmative claims for the poor under the fourteenth amendment, a 
position he defends on explicitly Rawlsian grounds.99 
The problem once again comes in the transition from a pure nor-
mative philosophy to direct legal applications. Through what institu-
tional process are these sharply countermajoritarian normative ideals 
to be implemented? Constitutions are drafted and amended through 
majoritarian or even supermajoritarian processes. Once drafted, of 
course, constitutions can be interpreted in countermajoritarian ways, 
making it possible to implement certain ideals to which the drafting 
majorities might not have assented. The problem, however, is that the 
interpreting judiciary tends to lack effective feedback to force judges to 
reconsider their mistakes; the natural human tendency to imagine that 
most of one's prior actions produced good results is unchecked. 100 
98. Numerous legal commentators sympathetic to Rawls have proposed precisely such a role 
for the courts. See. e.g., Michelman, Foreword: On Protecting the Poor Through the Fourteenth 
Amendment, 83 HARV. L. REV. 7, 14-16 (1969) (relying upon Rawls' theory of justice as fairne~s 
as articulated in journal articles that preceded Rawls' book). For a view that the Court should 
identify and protect widely shared ideals, see Perry, The Abortion Funding Cases: A Comment 011 
the Supreme Court's Role in American Government, 66 GEO. L.J. 1191, 1216-19 (1978). Dwor-
kin's view is that the very idea of regarding a constitution as binding presupposes a prior commit-
ment to pre-political rights which courts properly consider in interpreting the constitutional text. 
See R. DWORKIN, The Forum of Principle, in A MATrER OF PRINCIPLE, supra note 4, at 33, 34-
38. 
99. Michelman, supra note 98, at 13-16. 
JOO. See T. SOWELL, KNOWLEDGE AND DECISIONS 39 (1980): 
Where political decision making is broadly defined to include judicial decision making, feed-
back from those affected is even less effective. Moreover, the cost of a court's monitoring 
the consequences of its own decisions could easily be prohibitive, and especially where the 
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Over time, the opportunity to rationalize the temptations of power 
with the guide to "adopt policies people would favor if they ·did not 
know who they were" would be almost as great as that under utilitari-
anism. The poor are undoubtedly the intended beneficiaries of aca-
demic versions of Rawlsian judging, but in a world of unintended 
consequences they need not be its actual beneficiaries. 
In addition to Rawls' position on the stability issue, there is a sec-
ond important feature of his theory where an ambiguity arises between 
the pure normative philosophy and the applied political philosophy 
visions. Rawls states that other things being equal, a principle is to be 
preferred if it is simple and if its lexical position with respect to other 
principles is clear. 101 As one such instance, Rawls holds that at least 
in modem Western societies, no violation of equal liberties can be jus-
tified by any socioeconomic gain for the poor (or the nonpoor). 102 Is 
this argument made at the level of pure normative philosophy or at the 
level of applied political philosophy? 
The answer again appears to be that Rawls wants the same ideas to 
serve both functions, 103 and again such an attempt to ride two horses 
is problematic. Indeed, at the level of pure normative philosophy, it is 
not at all clear that first best moral principles would be either simple 
or lexically ordered. 104 What is the lexical ordering of truth, love, 
friendship, beauty, autonomy, average human welfare, total human 
welfare, animal welfare, equality of opportunity, freedom of speech, 
freedom of religion, equality of political power, and satisfaction of ba-
sic needs? Even if some of these values seem intuitively much more 
important than others, it would not follow that every increment of im-
provement in the preferred value would be more important than any 
possible improvement in the lesser value. 105 As one example, it seems 
unlikely that many nonintellectuals would regard every increment of 
consequences include effects on people not party to the legal action, but whose whole con-
stellation of expectations have been changed. 
101. See J. RAWLS, supra note 10, at 320-21. 
102. Id. at 542-43: 
Now the basis for the priority ofliberty is roughly as follows: as the conditions of civili-
zation improve, the marginal significance for our good of further economic and social ad-
vantages diminishes relative to the interests of liberty, which became stronger as the 
conditions for the exercise of the equal freedoms are more fully realized. Beyond some point 
it becomes and then remains irrational from the standpoint of the original position to ac-
knowledge a lesser liberty for the sake of greater material means and amenities of office. 
103. See, e.g., id. at 324 (competing principles are ultimately less clear for ethical reasons). 
104. See Alexander & Schwarzschild, Liberalism, Neutrality, and Equality of Welfare vs. 
Equality of Resources, 16 PHIL. & Pun. AFF. 85 (1987) (arguing for such a plural conception of 
the Good). 
105. See T. SOWELL, supra note 100, at 118. 
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freedom of speech gained as more important than any improvement in 
the economic problems still facing modern Western societies. 
At the level of applied political philosophy, however, Rawls' 
strong commitment to simple, clear, lexically ranked principles fares 
much better. The political temptation to restrict the true sources of 
the opposition's power - free thought, free speech, voting, the right to 
hold office - and to justify such action with noblesse oblige principles 
is great. 106 Rawls' prescription here is sufficiently clear that a political 
actor whose power was legitimized by Rawlsian principles but who 
was tempted to stray from them under the new incentives of power 
would find it extremely difficult to do so in the case of the basic liber-
ties. Rawls repeatedly stresses that he wants to identify political prin-
ciples that will take hold of the mind in such a way as to secure their 
faithful implementation, and he correctly holds that simplicity is an 
important virtue in a theory's ability to perform that applied political 
philosophy function.101 
Once again, these abstract points take on concrete significance in 
actual cases, including decisions under the freedom of speech clause of 
the first amendment. For example, in Communist Party v. Subversive 
Activities Control Board, 108 the Court sustained an order requiring the 
Communist Party to register with the Subversive Activities Control 
Board of the Attorney General's office. The Court emphasized the 
detailed legislative findings regarding the problem of possible Commu-
nist subversion. Speaking for the majority, Justice Frankfurter saw 
the question in pure normative philosophy terms, i.e., the importance 
as values of liberty and the preservation of the nation: 
[W]here the problems of accommodating the exigencies of self-preserva-
tion and the values of liberty are as complex and intricate as [here], ... 
the legislative judgment as to how that threat may best be met consist-
ently with the safeguarding of personal freedom is not to be set aside 
merely because the judgment of judges would, in the first instance, have 
chosen other methods.109 
Stating the issue as Justice Frankfurter does, it may be difficult to 
disagree, since the preservation of the nation is a precondition to all of 
the liberties protected by that nation. Unfortunately, Justice Frank-
furter failed to see the issue from the perspective of applied political 
philosophy, with its central concern for the corruptible empirical judg-
ment of the powerful regarding criticism of government policy. In this 
106. See J. RAWLS, supra note 10, at 544 (trading off liberty for welfare would ultimately be 
poor strategy for those in the original position). 
107. See id. at 320-2 I. 
108. 367 U.S. I (1961). 
109. 367 U.S. at 96-97. 
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respect, New York Times Co. v. United States, 110 the Pentagon Papers 
case, represents the contrary perspective of applied political philoso-
phy. The government argued that publication of the Pentagon Papers 
would seriously damage national security and should be enjoined. In a 
per curiam opinion, the Court held that the injunction violated the 
first amendment. Justice Douglas' concurring opinion stated: "The 
dominant purpose of the First Amendment was to prohibit the wide-
spread practice of governmental suppression of embarrassing informa-
tion."111 The issue was not the pure normative question of national 
security versus press liberty; it was the applied political philosophy 
question of restrictions on press liberty that purport, perhaps quite 
sincerely, to serve the national security in a context where the state's 
incentive to see such dangers in any embarrassing disclosures is ex-
traordinarily powerful. 
V. NOZICK AND THE LIBERTARIANS 
Robert Nozick's book Anarchy, State, and Utopia is yet another 
attempt to straddle pure normative philosophy and applied political 
philosophy with one set of concepts. 112 Nozick argues for a minimal 
state that enforces preexisting rights to one's own body and talents as 
well as rights to acquire and transfer property in external resources. 
He argues that further actions by the state violate people's rights and 
are therefore morally unjustified.113 
As with all such attempts to fulfill both functions of political phi-
losophy with the same philosophical ideal, tensions between the func-
tions are likely to arise, and it is interesting to see exactly where that 
schism occurs in yet another context. The problems with Nozick's 
philosophy are almost the polar opposite of the utilitarian's problems. 
As noted earlier, utilitarianism as a pure normative philosophy is im-
perfect but probably not so seriously wrong that one would not greatly 
appreciate a chance to live in a world in which policies actually satis-
fied its requirements. 114 However, utilitarianism makes a poor applied 
political philosophy that would leave no meaningful check on the 
temptations arising from the Leviathan state. 
By contrast, Nozick's position represents a poor first best pure nor-
110. 403 U.S. 713 (1971). 
111. 403 U.S. at 723-24. 
112. R. NOZICK, supra note 4, at 6 ("Moral philosophy sets the background for, and bounda-
ries of, political philosophy. What persons may and may not do to one another limits what they 
may do through the apparatus of a state, or do to establish such an apparatus."). 
113. Id. at 149. 
114. See text following note 64 supra. 
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mative philosophy but a much better applied political philosophy. 
The fact that Nozick's philosophy, like utilitarianism, purports to 
serve both functions is, I believe, the source of the ambivalence many 
people feel about these ideas. Indeed, it is hard to read either philoso-
phy without experiencing an alternating attraction and repulsion, a 
paradoxical reaction that suggests a deep distinction is being smoothed 
over. 
Consider first Nozick's theory as a pure normative philosophy that 
explicitly contrasts itself with utilitarianism as a normative philoso-
phy .115 It is certainly true that utilitarianism justifies some unfortu-
nate results, such as the coercive use of individuals for the amusement 
of others. As such, it seems perfectly appropriate to acknowledge 
moral rights that trump utility maximization in some instances along 
the lines of Rawls' theory, or at least presumptive moral rights that 
can be outweighed only when the balance of utility strongly favors the 
coercive exaction. But it is one thing to recognize a minimum inviola-
bility of persons that must be respected in any endeavor to maximize 
happiness; it is quite another to make those moral rights or entitle-
ments so extensive that happiness is virtually banished as a morally 
legitimate end of the state. Are property rights so important that suc-
cessful attempts to minimize widespread misery and suffering by limit-
ing such rights would be morally illegitimate? Such a view simply 
drains rights of their moral significance. 116 
Of course, Nozick is aware of the philosophical importance of 
human happiness, but his idea is that there ought to be moral side 
constraints on a human actor's ability to pursue those good ends. 117 It 
simply is not right, Nozick holds, to use a human being without her 
consent as if she were an inanimate object even for the purpose of 
increasing happiness. 118 Nor is it right to use property that a person 
created or was purposely given as if it were manna from heaven. 11 9 In 
short, Nozick seeks to make his vision intuitively attractive by di-
recting attention away from the end states in question and toward the 
propriety of particular human actions. 
115. R. NOZICK, supra note 4, at 35-53 (arguing for moral side constraints on actions affect-
ing humans that utilitarianism lacks; also arguing that we care about more than conscious exper-
iences, as is shown by imagining an "experience machine"). 
116. See Scheffler, Natural Rights, Equality, and the Minimal State, in READING NOZICK 
148, 160 (J. Paul ed. 1981). 
117. See R. NOZICK, supra note 4, at 26-35. 
118. Id. at 32. 
119. Thus Nozick criticizes Rawls' position for creating a philosophical system that makes 
the failure to take such action appear irrational. "[P]eople meeting together behind a veil of 
ignorance to decide who gets what, knowing nothing about any special entitlements people may 
have, will treat anything to be distributed as manna from heaven." Id. at 199. 
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Although these arguments about right and wrong conduct are not 
without some intuitive force, the stronger intuitions of modern man 
are drawn to the tangible evil of human suffering and the felt need for 
purposeful human action rationally calculated to alleviate that suffer-
ing. At the pure normative philosophy level, the idea of an absolute 
side constraint upon the abridgement of minor values even for the pur-
pose of furthering major values seems irrational. 120 Nozick poses a 
similar question explicitly: 
Isn't it irrational to accept a side constraint C, rather than a view that 
directs minimizing the violations of C? (The latter view treats C as a 
condition rather than a constraint.) If nonviolation of C is so important, 
shouldn't that be the goal? How can a concern for the nonviolation of C 
lead to a refusal to violate C even when this would prevent other more 
extensive violations of C? What is the rationale for placing the nonviola-
tion of rights as a side constraint upon action instead of including it 
solely as a goal of one's actions?121 
Nozick is not alone in concluding that side constraints upon wrong 
actions do indeed apply even if the action would prevent even more 
wrong actions. Charles Fried also defends categorical theses such as 
"Do not intentionally kill innocent people" even where such an action 
would spare the lives of many. 122 The Ten Commandments and other 
religious sources seem to prohibit certain kinds of actions without in-
quiry into their noble purposes. Immanuel Kant warned that one 
must not use a person solely as a means, presumably including as a 
means toward otherwise highly valuable ends. 123 No one who was 
raised in Western culture can be totally lacking in sympathy for the 
idea of categorically wrong action. And yet the mind rebels against 
the irrationality of not recognizing twice E to be a more serious evil 
than E. 
Once again, the writer who has seen these paradoxes most clearly 
is Friedrich Hayek. Hayek argues that many of our moral intuitions 
are the product of biological and especially social evolution, in that 
peoples who held such views were generally more successful in ad-
vancing their purposes and taming natural hazards than others. 124 As 
120. See note 116 supra and accompanying text. 
121. R. NOZICK, supra note 4, at 30 (emphasis in original). 
122. C. FRIED, RIGHT AND WRONG (1978). 
123. See I. KANT, GROUNDWORK OF THE METAPHYSIC OF MORALS 96 (H. Paton trans. 
1964). 
124. See F. HAYEK, The Origins a11d Effects of Our Morals: A Problem for Science. in THE 
EsSF.NCF. OF HAYEK 318, 320 (1984) (arguing that "Social Darwinism" was a mistake because 
social evolution operates "through a different mechanism'' than biological evolution, although 
both historical processes '"relie[d) on the same principles of selection, namely the multiplication 
of individual lives"). 
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such, Hayek, following Hume, argues that such moral intuitions are 
not the outcome of our reason and are quite likely to strike our con-
scious intellect as irrational. 125 Nevertheless, Hayek defends such 
morals as having a more secure foundation in proven success than an 
alternative moral system we might mentally construct from our views 
about first principles.126 He too reaches the libertarian conclusion that 
all actors, including the state, ought to feel constrained to respect the 
rules and principles that define and circumscribe both personal free-
dom and property rights.121 
Since Hayek's views played an important role in the prior section's 
analysis of Critical Legal Studies as well, it is important to be clear 
about the limitations as well as the merits of his perspective. From an 
intellectual point of view, Hayek's thesis is disturbing because it seems 
to advocate a form of self-hypnosis, i.e., that our moral intuitions are 
only instruments directed toward higher goals such as survival and 
utility, but we should quickly forget that linkage and convince our-
selves that the morality itself is in fact more important than those 
higher goals. 128 This article has taken a different approach, seeking to 
rationalize these paradoxes - to explain them in a way the rational 
mind will not rebel against. There is a reason why the applied political 
philosophy that a political actor should consciously strive to advance 
differs from the first principles of pure normative philosophy. Indeed, 
there are at least the four reasons that were identified in the introduc-
tory section of the article. There is no need to hide the true first best 
values from political actors out of fear that they will seek to pursue 
them directly; what is needed is for political actors themselves to real-
ize that some moral standards require factual assessments that are sys-
tematically untrustworthy, and therefore that arguments directly 
addressed to such broader values ought not to be politically 
entertained. 129 
125. See id. at 318-19: 
[I]n some respects our morals endow us with capacities greater than our reason could do, 
namely the ability to adapt to conditions of which the individual mind could never be 
aware .... It is the reason why, as David Hume so clearly understood, "the rules of moral· 
ity are not the conclusions of our reason." 
126. Id. at 324-25. Hayek argues that the benefits of the process of social evolution apply 
only to the grown morals of tradition and not to morals which have been invented to serve 
the satisfaction of human desires. . . . Hedonistic, utilitarian, or egalitarian morals, or con-
ceptions like distributive justice, are all intellectual inventions which have never been tested 
and have never been shown that they improve, or even could secure, the preservation of the 
group. 
127. See ge11eral/y F. HAYEK, THE CONSTITUTION OF LIBERTY (1960). 
128. Id. at 68 ('•Like all moral principles, [liberty] demands that it be accepted as a value in 
itself .... We shall not achieve the results we want if we do not accept it as a creed or presump· 
tion so strong that no considerations of expediency can be allowed to limit it."). 
129. On the general structure of arguments for the indirect pursuit of ethical goals, see Alex-
October 1987] Political Philosophy and Law 153 
When one moves from the level of pure normative philosophy to 
the level of applied political philosophy, the verdict upon Nozick's 
book improves substantially. Nozick is, of course, greatly concerned 
with avoiding the horrors of twentieth-century experiences with totali-
tarianism and its characteristic institutions such as compulsory la-
bor, 130 restrictions on emigration,131 and "reeducation camps."132 
Nozick's contribution is to explain how these horrible institutions can 
come to seem logical to one who begins with the humanitarian desire 
to enforce a distributional pattern of the form "to each according to 
his ." 133 For liberty of any sort - purposely acting on the 
basis of principles different from the principles of the pattern - will 
persistently frustrate and anger the government official who accepts 
the idea that deviations from the pattern are injustices. 134 
This argument of Nozick's also does not succeed at the level of 
pure normative philosophy, where one could simply advocate an opti-
mal mix of liberty and distributional pattern. 135 But Nozick is again 
persuasive in explaining the naivete of seeking to transfer this "op-
timality" insight to the level of applied political philosophy where the 
initial restrictions of liberty generate their own dynamic that is driven 
by symbiosis between the growing state and economic power holders: 
To strengthen the state and extend the range of its functions as a way of 
preventing it from being used by some portion of the populace makes it a 
more valuable prize and a more alluring target for corrupting by anyone 
able to offer an officeholder something desirable; it is, to put it gently, a 
poor strategy. 136 
By contrast, Nozick observes that the institution of private prop-
erty sets in motion a different dynamic. Nozick rejects the idea that 
the institution of private property represents the taking of value from a 
preexisting common pool, since the informational and incentive effects 
ander, Pursuing the Good-/11directly. 95 ETHICS 315 (1985). Alexander does note that one way 
of resolving the general paradox is to refuse to publicize the fact that one is advocating the first 
best goals, but at the level of political philosophy such secrecy is both difficult and dangerous. 
See id. at 325-29. 
130. See R. NOZICK, supra note 4, at 169-72. 
131. See id. at 173-74. 
132. See id. at 163. 
133. See id. at 159-64. 
134. See id. 
135. See Kronman, Contract Law and Distributive Justice, 89 YALE L.J. 472, 506-07 (1980). 
[I]f we value individual liberty, we are bound to reach a point at which further restrictions 
on conduct cannot be justified by the additional increment of distributive fairness that they 
yield .... 
This conflict does not, however, provide a reason for abandoning liberalism altogether 
since it is not a crushing objection to a theory of society that it values two different things 
which conflict even across a wide range of cases. 
136. R. NOZICK, supra note 4, at 272. 
154 Michigan Law Review (Vol. 86:123 
of property expand that pool many orders of magnitude. 137 The key 
point for Nozick is not that property might produce utilitarian gains 
but rather that a state official can act to protect property without ac-
cepting any vision that calls for the purposeful state preference of par-
ticular people over others, i.e., without accepting a vision that 
generates the dynamic of an increasingly corruptible rent-seeking 
state. 138 
Unfortunately, Nozick is no clearer than Rawls or the utilitarians 
about whether his theory is offered at the level of pure normative phi-
losophy or at the level of applied political philosophy. Is he saying 
that there is no moral balancing that can take place between individu-
als or that a government official ought not to believe she should be 
conducting such a balancing? Again, the truth seems to be that 
Nozick is making both claims. 139 But surely this attempt to hold to-
gether two discrete disciplines severely strains one's intuitions at the 
level of pure normative philosophy; a person born blind and disabled 
ought not to have to beg for charity to lead a decent life. The problem 
is to find a way to enshrine the most urgent comparative claims in 
political institutions without state officials' coming to accept the cor-
ruptible general vision of coercive moral balancing between individu-
als or a just distributional pattern. Focusing upon the distinction 
between pure normative philosophy and applied political philosophy 
may not supply the answer to this problem, but it at least directs atten-
tion to the relevant question. 
To the extent that Nozick is aware of the distinction between the 
two functions of political philosophy, it does appear that it is the ap-
plied political philosophy function he most wants his theory to fulfill. 
This is displayed most clearly in Nozick's vision of Utopia, where he 
plainly indicates that his libertarian applied political philosophy is ul-
timately instrumentally justified by its contribution to values other 
than (or in addition to) liberty and property. 140 Nozick imagines 
someone's saying "So is this all it comes to: Utopia is a free society?" 
and Nozick responds: 
Utopia is not just a society in which the framework is realized. For who 
could believe that ten minutes after the framework was established, we 
would have utopia? Things would be no different than now. It is what 
grows spontaneously from the individual choices of many people over a 
137. Id. at 177. 
138. Id. at 272-73. 
139. The rent-seeking problem is discussed by Nozick, id. at 272-73. However, Nozick also 
clearly states, "Using one of these people for the benefit of others, uses him and benefits the 
others. Nothing more .... Talk of an overall social good covers this up." Id. at 33. 
140. Id. at 297-334. 
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long period of time that will be worth speaking eloquently about. 141 
To summarize the argument, Nozick's philosophy suffers from a 
problem that is almost the direct opposite of the utilitarian's problems. 
Utilitarianism makes a tolerable, if imperfect, pure normative philoso-
phy, but any failing to see the distinction between disciplines is likely 
to favor utilitarianism also as an applied political philosophy, where it 
fails badly. Nozick's vision makes a tolerable if imperfect applied 
political philosophy, but one who sees its political wisdom may also be 
tempted to embrace its harsh normative philosophy, where it surely 
ought to be rejected. Or, alternatively, one who sees Nozick's serious 
shortcomings at the pure normative philosophy level may overlook the 
book's great merit of the level of applied political philosophy. These 
are the recurring problems of failing to recognize the two functions of 
political philosophy as distinct. 
VI. CONCLUSION: NORMATIVE AND POSITIVE ANALYSIS IN 
POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 
This article has sought to establish the thesis that political philoso-
phy can be clarified and ultimately improved by focusing attention 
upon the two distinct functions such a philosophy can serve. Greater 
analytical clarity in turn makes it appear that at least one part of polit-
ical philosophy - the sphere of applied political philosophy - cannot 
be separated from factual theories of cause-and-effect in the area of 
social phenomena. For the questions of how legal actors will interact 
with a philosophy, whether their adherence to the philosophy will re-
main stable, and what unintended consequences will follow from the 
interactions that arise, are factual questions in need of scientific inves-
tigation. More particularly, the microeconomic discipline of public 
choice theory, which directs attention explicitly to the information 
and incentives facing public decisionmakers, ought to be integrated 
fully with normative analysis in arriving at a sensible applied political 
philosophy. 142 The question of what values actual legal actors ought 
to hold in a world that is causally connected in particular ways must 
be seen as a complex question requiring positive as well as normative 
analysis. 
141. Id. at 332 (emphasis in original). 
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